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RECONSIDERING IN RE TECHNOLOGY LICENSING CORPORATION
AND THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN PATENT INVALIDITY SUITS
ANDREW W. BATEMAN*
INTRODUCTION
"The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is pro-
tected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to
the citizen ... should be jealously guarded by the courts."1 The rights of
individuals in patent cases are no less deserving of the stubborn protections
of the Seventh Amendment. Although some commentators argue that prac-
tical concerns should dictate a greatly reduced-or even nonexistent-jury
role in patent cases, 2 the Seventh Amendment reflects a concern with prin-
ciples well beyond mere "efficient judicial administration."' 3 "The founders
of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an impor-
tant bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be
left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judi-
ciary."
4
Nevertheless, over the past decade, the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have steadily eroded the jury's role in patent cases by shifting the
weight of decision making to the judge. In Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, the Federal Circuit held (in "Markman F') that, although infringe-
ment claims generally preserve the right to trial by jury, claim construction 5
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2007; M.S.,
Electrical Engineering, National Technological University, 2001; B.S., Electrical Engineering, Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994. The author would like to thank Professor Timothy Hol-
brook for helping to shape and refine this note, and Jilly for all of her support.
1. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942).
2. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 369 (2000) (noting that "increased participation by juries in patent
cases.., has caused a number of scholars and other commentators to question the propriety of jury
resolution of patent cases").
3. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. Id.
5. Claim construction refers to the process of interpreting the meaning of patent claims, which
are the most important part of the patent. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW
226-27 (2003). Claims define the outer perimeter of the patentee's right to exclude others, thereby
serving to notify the public of how closely one may imitate the invention without infringing. Id. at 227.
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is a purely legal question for the judge alone. 6 Granting certiorari, the Su-
preme Court (in "Markman I") affirmed that the judge, not the jury, should
construe patent claims. 7 Although the Supreme Court did not expressly
affirm the Markman I holding that claim construction is a purely legal
question subject to de novo review, the Federal Circuit in Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc. read Markman II as supporting-or at least not
overtuming-that conclusion. 8 By continuing to view claim construction as
a purely legal question, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that juries may not
decide any factual issues underlying claim construction.9
The practical effect of Markman I and II and Cybor on the role of the
jury extends well beyond mere claim construction. A claim's meaning is
often dispositive of whether an accused device literally infringes that
claim. 10 Therefore, the jury's responsibilities in infringement cases have
been in large part confined to determining whether infringement exists
under the doctrine of equivalents."1 But even in relation to the doctrine of
equivalents, the jury's role is both uncertain and tightly constrained. While
the Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemi-
cal Co., remarked that there was "ample support in [its] prior cases" to
conclude that equivalence is a question for the jury, it left the door open by
6. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
Federal Circuit compared claim construction to the construction of other legal documents and noted that
valid patents should be fully integrated documents, which a person of ordinary skill in the art should be
able to interpret without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 984-85. While the court conceded that a
judge may need to look at extrinsic evidence (such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony), it
maintained that judges only use such evidence as an aid to their understanding of the technology-and
the level of ordinary skill within that technology-and not in a traditional evidentiary fact-finding
sense. Id. at 980-81.
7. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I1), 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (holding
"that the interpretation of the word 'inventory' . . . is an issue for the judge, not the jury"). For a de-
tailed discussion of Markman II, see infra Part II.
8. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Cybor
majority concluded that "the Supreme Court's [Markman I1] opinion conclusively and repeatedly states
that claim construction is purely legal." Id. at 1456. The majority also noted that-even if the Supreme
Court did not hold either way on the issue-the Federal Circuit's own majority opinion in Markman I
would remain authoritative and dictate treating claim construction as a purely legal question subject to
de novo review. Id.
9. As Judge Newman pointed out, this result tends to "confound" the traditional litigation proc-
ess. See id. at 1480 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Without doubt, factual disputes arise and must be re-
solved in order to interpret the claims. Such facts are normally resolved at trial-yet we now deny
ourselves the opportunity even to consider the findings of the trial court.").
10. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 226.
11. The doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee to establish infringement even where a device or
process does not literally infringe a claim, and serves to prevent others from escaping liability by mak-
ing minor, insubstantial changes to the invention. Id. at 238-40. Infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents requires that the accused device or process includes at least an equivalent of each and every
limitation of the claim. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
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declining to expressly hold on the issue. 12 And even if equivalence remains
a jury question, recently established legal limitations on the doctrine have
greatly reduced the number of situations in which it might be applied. 13 As
a result, the jury's role in infringement suits-where, ostensibly, "there is
no dispute" that the right to jury trial exists 14 -has been severely curtailed.
More recently, the Federal Circuit has attacked the patentee's right to
jury trial in the context of patent invalidity suits. In 2001, the Federal Cir-
cuit held in Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc. that there is no
right to trial by jury where the patentee seeks only the equitable relief of
injunction and the defendant raises the affirmative defense of invalidity. 15
Four years later, in In re Technology Licensing Corporation, the Federal
Circuit expanded Tegal by holding that there is no right to trial by jury in a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of patent invalidity,
where the defendant counterclaims with alleged infringement and seeks an
injunction as the sole remedy. 16 The patentee in Technology Licensing
petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the right to trial
12. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 38. In the decision below, the Federal Circuit had noted that
equivalence is a jury question. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1525
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
13. See Judge Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Enabling the Jury to
Apply Patent Law Rationally, Address Before the Yale Law and Technology Society (Apr. 14, 1998),
edited transcript in I YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 1 (1999) ("All of [the limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents] are issues of law and therefore are to be decided by the judge, not by the
jury .... Therefore in a significant percentage of cases, there is the possibility that equivalent infringe-
ment will disappear entirely as a viable issue long before the case goes to the jury."). Perhaps the most
common limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is "prosecution history estoppel": almost invariably,
applicants find it necessary to amend their patent claims during prosecution, and in Warner-Jenkinson
the Supreme Court held that, where the prosecution history is silent about the reason for an amendment,
the amendment creates the rebuttable presumption that it was made for a reason related to patentability.
520 U.S. at 33. Soon after, the Federal Circuit nearly destroyed the doctrine of equivalents by holding
that the failure to rebut the Warner-Jenkinson presumption gives rise to a complete bar on a patentee's
ability to assert equivalence with respect to the amended elements of a claim. See Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo 1), 234 F.3d 558, 567-68 (Fed. Cir. 2000). While the
Supreme Court disagreed and relaxed this limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine is still
very limited in its applicability. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo II),
535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) (holding that amendments of claim limitations made for reasons related to
patentability create a presumption of non-equivalence, but also that the presumption may be rebutted if
the "equivalent [was] unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale underlying the amend-
ment ... bear[s] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there [is] some other
reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial
substitute in question"). In addition to prosecution history estoppel, other legal limitations constrain the
applicability of the doctrine of equivalents. For example, a patentee cannot establish infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents if the prior art would have precluded the patentee from writing the claim
more broadly to expressly include the asserted equivalent. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geof-
frey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990). As a legal issue subject to de novo review, id., this
"prior art preclusion" limitation further diminishes the jury's role in infringement suits.
14. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 11), 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
15. 257 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
16. 423 F.3d 1286, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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by jury should always attach to a declaratory judgment action to invalidate
a patent, regardless of the type of relief the patentee seeks. 17 The Federal
Circuit, however, denied the petition, 18 and the Supreme Court denied
cert. 19
This Comment argues that Technology Licensing was wrongly de-
cided, and should be reconsidered en banc if the issue again comes before
the Federal Circuit. Part I provides a brief background of the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases, focusing on the historical-
analog test laid out in Tull v. United States.20 Part II examines the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Markman H and focuses on how the Court arrived at
its holding that claim construction is not a jury issue, despite the lack of
clear guidance from either the historical-analog test of Tull or precedent.
Part III examines the Federal Circuit's reasoning in cases concerning the
right to jury trial in suits involving patent invalidity claims and focuses on
the majority and dissent opinions in Technology Licensing. Finally, Part IV
applies the Supreme Court's Markman II analysis to Technology Licensing
and concludes that (1) neither the historical-analog test nor precedent ade-
quately support the court's denial of the right to jury trial in declaratory
judgment actions of patent invalidity, and (2) functional considerations and
policy concerns favor leaving the resolution of the many factual questions
underlying patent invalidity claims in the hands of the jury.
I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in suits
at common law with an amount in controversy exceeding twenty dollars.
21
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment's language as
guaranteeing the right to jury trial in any action that is analogous to a suit at
common law, rather than a case tried in courts of equity or admiralty, as of
the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted in 1791.22 To determine
which type of suit an action is more analogous to, the Court in Tull v.
United States used a two-prong test: (1) "compare the statutory action to
18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of
17. Id. at 1287-88.
18. Id. at 1288.
19. Tech. Licensing Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 126 S. Ct. 2353 (2006).
20. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.").
22. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
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the courts of law and equity," and (2) "examine the remedy sought and
determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.
'23
Application of the second prong of the historical-analog test-under
which the court must characterize the type of relief sought by the claim-
ant-"is '[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous common-
law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guar-
antees a jury trial."' 24 Moreover, the two prongs of the test must be consid-
ered jointly rather than independently. In Tull, for example, where the right
to jury trial was at issue in a suit involving civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act, the Court rejected the Government's proposal that a public nui-
sance action be considered the appropriate historical analog under the first
prong, while an action for disgorgement be considered the appropriate his-
torical analog under the second prong. 25 Instead, the Court sought "a single
historical analog, taking into consideration the nature of the cause of action
and the remedy as two important factors."'26
The Court in Tull did note that the Supreme Court has in some cases-
even where the historical-analog test might otherwise suggest that the Sev-
enth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury-considered the
"practical limitations of a jury trial and its functional compatibility with
proceedings outside of traditional courts of law" to determine that the Sev-
enth Amendment's guarantee does not apply. 27 Unlike the similarly labeled
"functional considerations" addressed by the Supreme Court in Markman
II,28 however, this particular limitation on the right to jury trial only applies
where "public rights" (as opposed to "private rights") are at issue. 29 Cases
involving "public rights" are those that involve a statutory cause of action
that Congress may assign to a "non-Article III court." 30 Because an action
for a declaration of patent invalidity "may properly be brought in an Article
III court," this limitation on the Seventh Amendment protection "does not
affect [a court's] analysis."31
23. Id. at 417-18. Legal remedies are "ordinarily an award of money damages," while equitable
remedies are those in which a court, at its discretion, can "adapt the relief to the circumstances of the
case" (e.g., by granting injunctive relief). I AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 6 (2006).
24. Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
25. Id. at 421 n.6.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 418 n.4.
28. See infra Part 11.
29. See Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) ("Unless a legal cause of action
involves 'public rights,' Congress may not deprive parties litigating over such a right of the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee to a jury trial.").
30. Id.
31. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 972 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990)), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
937
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II. THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Markman II, the Supreme Court used the first prong of the histori-
cal-analog test to determine whether the right to trial by jury extends to the
issue of patent claim construction. 32 The Court noted that there is no direct
antecedent of modem claim construction 33 and that the closest analog was
the construction of the patent specifications describing the invention-an
issue which, according to the Court's historical survey, appeared to have
been the province of judges rather than juries around 1791.34
The Court, however, recognized that the historical analog of specifica-
tion construction could not provide any clear answers. 35 Only a "mere
smattering" of patent cases from the period were available and, of those,
"[f]ew ... even touch[ed] upon the proper interpretation of disputed terms
in the specifications at issue .... -"36 Although the Court determined that
the few sources available "show[ed] no established jury practice sufficient
to support an argument by analogy that today's construction of a claim
should be a guaranteed jury issue"-and indeed supported the opposite
conclusion-it did not base its holding on that determination. 37 Rather, the
Court held that the historical-analog test was inconclusive.
38
Realizing that it "must look elsewhere ... in order to allocate [claim
construction] as between court or jury," the Court proceeded to look at
precedent. 39 The Court noted that its own past cases held that construing a
patent is a question of law for the court. 40 Markman argued, however, that
32. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I1), 517 U.S. 370, 376-84 (1996). The
Court ignored the second prong of the test, however, which focuses on the remedy sought. This was
likely because the Court felt that the remedy was irrelevant where it was only analyzing the right to trial
by jury in the limited context of claim construction, rather than the infringement action as a whole.
33. Id. at 378-79. Claim practice received no statutory recognition until 1836, and claims were not
required by statute until 1870. Id. at 379.
34. Id. at 379-84.
35. Id. at 379-83.
36. Id. at 379-80. The Court explained that the "absence of an established practice should not
surprise us, given the primitive state of jury patent practice at the end of the 18th century, when juries
were still new to the field." Id. at 380. By the end of the eighteenth century, "no more than twenty-two
[reported] cases came before the superior courts of London." Id. at 380 n.4 (alterations in original)
(quoting H. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1852, at 71 (1984)).
37. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 380. The Court also held that the historical record did not support the
patentee's "more modest contention" that juries were at least responsible for construing "terms of art"
within a specification. Id. at 383-84.
38. Id. at 384.
39. Id. at 384-88.
40. See id. at 384 n. 10. The Court noted its much earlier holding that the construction of a patent
"is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing the letters-patent, and the description of
the invention and specification of claim annexed to them." Id. at 384 (quoting Winans v. Denmead, 56
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when the construction of a claim depended on extrinsic evidence, the jury
and not the court had construed the patent terms.41 Primarily, Markman
relied on two nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases-Bischoff v.
Wethered42 and Tucker v. Spalding43-in support of his contention. 44 In
Bischoff, the Court held it was improper for a court to instruct a jury as to
whether the inventions described by two patents were identical. 45 Markman
contended that, because the Court in Bischoff held that the issue of identity
should be determined by the jury and not the judge, the prerequisite step of
construing patent terms must also rest with the jury. 46 The Court in Mark-
man II, however, emphasized the critical distinction between issues of
identity and issues of patent construction, repeating the observation from
Bischoff that "[i]t is not the construction of the instrument, but the character
of the thing invented, which is sought in questions of identity and diversity
of inventions. '47 Thus, by leaving the issue of identity to the jury, the Court
in Bischoff had not gone so far as to support the proposition that the jury
should construe patent terms. 48 Tucker likewise failed to support Mark-
man's argument, as it expressly relied on Bischoff and used similar reason-
ing.49
Having found that "history and precedent provide no clear answers,"
the Court next turned to "functional considerations" to determine whether
the judge or the jury should construe patent claims.50 The functional con-
sideration that the Court focused on was, naturally, whether the judge or
jury would generally be "better suited" to construe patent claim language.
51
The Court noted that judges have more training and experience than jurors
when it comes to the construction of written instruments, and therefore are
U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854)). The Court also cited Winans v. New York & Erie R. Co., 62 U.S. (21
How.) 88, 100 (1859), and Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740),
in support of that proposition. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 384-85.
41. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 385.
42. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1870).
43. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 453 (1872).
44. Markman It, 517 U.S. at 385.
45. Bischoff, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 814-16.
46. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 385.
47. Id. at 386 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bischoff, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 816).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 388.
51. Id. The Court justified its reliance on functional considerations by noting that, when an issue
"falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction
at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question." Id. (quoting Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
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"likely to do better" at it.52 The technical complexity of patents, exacer-
bated by the specialized legal doctrines developed in the courts and the
Patent & Trademark Office, only reinforced the Court's conclusion. 53
Like the Federal Circuit majority in Markman I, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the importance of extrinsic evidence (such as expert testi-
mony) in claim construction. 54 But although the Court recognized that "in
theory there could be a case in which a simple credibility judgment would
suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was equally consistent
with a patent's internal logic," it believed that such cases would be rare and
that credibility determinations would "be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document." 55 Therefore, even though
credibility determinations are normally considered the jury's forte, the
Court stated that "a jury's capabilities to evaluate demeanor ... are much
less significant [to claim construction] than [the judge's] trained ability to
evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent. '56
Finally, the Markman II Court looked at a policy concern: the impor-
tance of uniformity in the interpretation of a given patent. 57 There can be
little doubt that a robust patent system requires some uniformity in the in-
terpretation of a patent's claims. The claims, after all, delimit the scope of
the invention and inform both the patentee and the public of the precise
outer bounds of the patentee's property interest. 58 While collateral estoppel
might provide some uniformity of interpretation even if claim construction
were left to the jury, it would not apply where the patentee litigates against
a new and independent defendant. 59 The Court noted that if claim construc-
tion were instead held to be a legal issue for the court, the principle of stare
decisis would operate to provide broader uniformity. 60 Given the impor-
52. Id. at 388-89.
53. Id. at 389.
54. See id. ("It is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made about the experts who
testify in patent cases .... ").
55. Id.; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("[In using extrinsic evidence for claim construction], the court is not crediting certain evidence
over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is looking to the extrinsic
evidence to assist in its construction of the written document, a task it is required to perform.").
56. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 389-90.
57. See id. at 390 ("[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an
independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court.").
58. See MUELLER, supra note 5, at 38-39 (analogizing the claim to a fence defining the borders of
real property); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ("The
limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive
genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the
public.").
59. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 391.
60. Id.
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tance of uniformity, and given that functional considerations counseled
against leaving claim construction to the jury, the Court held that the judge
alone should construe patent claims. 6
1
III. THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN INVALIDITY SUITS: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit developed its approach to the right to jury trial in
patent invalidity suits over the course of three cases: In re Lockwood,
62
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.,63 and, most recently, In re
Technology Licensing Corp.64 In each case, the issue of invalidity arose in
a different procedural setting, and the court used the historical-analog test
to determine whether the right to jury trial should attach. But while the
court's approach in Lockwood reflected its concern for preserving the pat-
entee's right to jury trial, 65 that same method of analysis would later, in
Tegal and Technology Licensing, result in a denial of that right.
In Lockwood, the patentee (Lockwood) alleged that American Air-
lines, Inc., had infringed claims in two of his patents, and sought both dam-
ages and injunctive relief.66 American asserted multiple defenses, including
invalidity, and also counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of nonin-
fringement or, alternatively, a declaratory judgment of invalidity and unen-
forceability. 67 Pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, the district
court dismissed Lockwood's infringement claim, leaving only American's
claim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity. 68 The district court then
proceeded to consider the remaining invalidity action, without allowing
Lockwood an interlocutory appeal on the infringement judgment. 69 Lock-
wood demanded a jury trial on the issue of invalidity, but the court, view-
ing the nature of the remaining declaratory judgment action as equitable,
61. Id.
62. 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
63. 257 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
64. 423 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
65. See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976 ("We cannot, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, deny
Lockwood [the option of jury trial] merely because the validity of his patents comes before the court in
a declaratory judgment action for invalidity rather than as a defense in an infringement suit. Lockwood
is entitled to have the factual questions relating to validity in this case tried to a jury as a matter of
right.").




CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
struck the demand. 70 Lockwood petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to reinstate his jury demand.
71
The Federal Circuit in Lockwood applied the two-pronged historical-
analog test of Tull, first comparing the action to eighteenth-century actions
brought in England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity, then
examining the remedy sought and determining whether it was more legal or
equitable in nature. 72 "Thus," the court noted, "if a particular action entails
either the adjudication of legal rights, or, alternatively, the implementation
of legal remedies, the district court must honor a jury demand to the extent
that disputed issues of fact concerning those rights and remedies require a
trial."'73 Recognizing that declaratory judgment actions were not known at
common law at the turn of the eighteenth century, 74 the court concluded
that the nearest historical analog was an "inverted" form of the declaratory
judgment action: "American's action resembles nothing so much as a suit
for patent infringement in which the affirmative defense of invalidity has
been pled, and Lockwood's right to a jury trial must be determined accord-
ingly."'75 Because the patentee in a typical infringement suit in 1791 could
have brought the suit in either law or equity, Lockwood's right to trial by
jury on the factual issues relating to patent validity was preserved. 76 Al-
though Lockwood was vacated (without explanation) by the Supreme
Court, the Federal Circuit subsequently stated that its reasoning in Lock-
wood was "neither supplanted nor questioned."'77
Six years later, in Tegal, the Federal Circuit held that where a plain-
tiff-patentee seeks only the equitable remedy of injunction and the defen-
dant asserts only the affirmative defense of invalidity with no
counterclaims, the defendant is not entitled to trial by jury. 78 In Tegal, the
patentee (Tegal Corporation) had initially requested a jury trial for its pat-
70. Id. at 969.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 972.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 973 (noting that Congress passed the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934).
75. Id. at 974.
76. Id. at 976. Interestingly, the court used this reasoning even though the alleged infringer had
already won summary judgment of non-infringement, leaving only the invalidity claim. Id. at 968.
Moreover, although the patentee had not yet exhausted his right of appeal on the infringement issue, the
court made it clear that "the particulars of [the patentee's] dismissed claim can play no part in our
determination whether he enjoys a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as to validity." Id. at 969.
Therefore, it appears that the court was not placing any weight on the particular remedy sought by the
patentee.
77. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 1341.
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ent infringement suit against Tokyo Electron America, Inc. ("TEA").79
Tegal sought both injunctive relief and damages, and TEA asserted af-
firmative defenses, including the defense of invalidity. 80 Tegal later with-
drew its claim for damages, causing the district court judge to order the
trial to proceed without a jury.8 1 TEA, however, desired a jury trial on the
issues raised in the pleadings and filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order. 82 The district court denied the motion to reconsider and eventually
found the asserted claims to be enforceable, not invalid, and willfully in-
fringed by TEA.
8 3
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that TEA was not entitled to a
jury trial. 84 The court again applied the historical-analog test of Tull, but
this time stressed the importance of the second prong-whether the remedy
is legal or equitable in nature-over the first. 85 For the first prong, the court
concluded that the patentee's decision to seek only the remedy of injunc-
tion meant that an analogous action in eighteenth-century England could
only have been brought in a court of equity. 86 In a somewhat redundant
application of the second prong, the court noted that injunction is clearly an
equitable remedy. 87 Therefore, under the court's analysis, both prongs sup-
ported a denial of the right to trial by jury.
88
In Technology Licensing, the Federal Circuit majority synthesized and
expanded Lockwood and Tegal to hold that there is no right to trial by jury
where the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, and
the defendant-patentee raises a counterclaim of infringement seeking only
an injunction. 89 The Technology Licensing case began when Technology
Licensing Corporation ("TLC") sued Videotek, Inc. in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging infringement
of claims in four of its patents.90 Videotek then filed a third-party com-
plaint against its supplier, Gennum Corporation, seeking to establish a right





84. Id. at 1341.
85. See id. at 1339 ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly taught that courts must examine both the
nature of the action involved and the remedy sought, and that the nature of the remedy is more impor-
tant than that of the action.").
86. Id. at 1340-41.
87. Id. at 1341.
88. Id.
89. In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1288-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
90. Id. at 1286.
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to indemnification should Videotek be found liable for infringement. 9 1
Gennum, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment action against TLC, seeking
a declaration that the asserted patent claims were invalid, unenforceable,
and not infringed. 92 TLC counterclaimed that Gennum was liable for direct
and contributory infringement of the asserted patent claims. 93 TLC and
Videotek subsequently settled, leaving only the action between TLC and
Gennum, consisting of Gennum's declaratory judgment claim and TLC's
infringement counterclaim.
94
Following a district court order that greatly reduced the amount of
damages that TLC might be able to obtain for infringement, TLC withdrew
its claim for damages and decided to seek only an injunction. 9 5 Gennum
initially requested a jury trial, then later withdrew that request; TLC, how-
ever, contended that it was still entitled to a jury trial. 96 Specifically, TLC
argued that the patentee's right to trial by jury always attaches to a declara-
tory judgment action to invalidate a patent, regardless of what type of relief
the patentee seeks in a counterclaim. 97 After the magistrate judge con-
cluded that TLC was not entitled to a jury trial, TLC petitioned the Federal
Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to grant the re-
quest for a jury trial. 98 The Federal Circuit majority, however, denied the
petition and endorsed the analysis of the magistrate judge, which had in
turn relied heavily on both Lockwood and Tegal.99
In his analysis, the magistrate judge had applied the two-pronged his-
torical-analog test of Tull. 100 Proceeding in reverse order, the magistrate
had first considered the second prong, concerning the nature of the remedy
sought.' 0 1 Claiming the outcome to be "relatively straightforward," the
magistrate stated that once TLC had withdrawn its request for damages, the
remedy sought by the patentee was "indisputably equitable in nature."
102
The magistrate judge then analyzed the action under the first prong. 103 The
magistrate relied on Lockwood's determination that the closest eighteenth-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1286-87.
94. Id. at 1287.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1286-87.
97. Id. at 1287.
98. Id. at 1288.
99. Id. at 1287-88.
100. Id. at 1287.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1287-88.
[Vol 82:2
2007] RECONSIDERING IN RE TECHNOLOGY LICENSING CORPORATION 945
century analog of a declaratory judgment action for invalidity with a coun-
terclaim of infringement would be the inverted form: an infringement ac-
tion with a defense of invalidity. 10 4 Although the Federal Circuit majority
considered the issue to be a close one, it affirmed the magistrate judge's
decision and agreed with his reasoning. 10 5
In her dissent, Judge Newman applied the historical-analog test to ar-
gue that the right to trial by jury always attaches to an invalidity claim.
106
She argued that the closest eighteenth-century analog was not the inverted
form of the declaratory judgment action, but rather the common law writ of
scirefacias.107 The writ of scirefacias is
a writ necessarily founded on some matter of record, and must issue out
of the court where that record is .... [It] is a waming given to the defen-
dant.., to appear in court and plead in bar of the execution, or show any
cause if he can by release or otherwise, why execution should not issue
on the judgment or record against him. 
108
Among its many applications, the writ of scirefacias had been issued
in the king's name to repeal or revoke (i.e., invalidate) patents, 10 9 making it
an obvious candidate for the closest historical analog to a patent invalidity
suit. The Technology Licensing majority, however, deferred to the reason-
ing of the Lockwood majority, where the court had concluded that the writ
of scire facias only applied to fraudulently obtained patents-and that the
writ was therefore more analogous to a modem declaratory judgment ac-
tion seeking unenforceability due to inequitable conduct, rather than one
seeking invalidity. I10
Although not expressly analyzing the second prong of the Tull test,
Judge Newman also seemed to view the remedy very differently than the
majority: while the majority focused exclusively on the injunctive remedy
sought by the patentee, Judge Newman focused on the declaration of inva-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1288.
106. Id. at 1292-93 (Newman, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. THOMAS CAMPBELL FOSTER, TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF SCIRE FACIAS, WITH AN APPENDIX
OF REFERENCES TO FORMS 2 (London, V. & R. Stevens & G. S. Norton 1851) (footnotes omitted).
Black's Law Dictionary defines scirefacias as "[a] writ requiring the person against whom it is issued
to appear and show cause why some matter of record should not be annulled or vacated, or why a
dormant judgment against that person should not be revived." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (7th ed.
2000).
109. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 360 (1888).
110. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
Nevertheless, the Lockwood court concluded that a writ of scire facias was tried at law, and would
therefore support the right to trial by jury if it had been the closest eighteenth-century analog under the
historical test. Id.
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lidity sought by Gennum."' l Noting that a determination of invalidity in-
herently requires an "adjudication of legal rights," she concluded that an
invalidity declaratory judgment action 112 supported the right to trial by
jury.
1 13
Both the majority and Judge Newman also looked at precedent. 114 The
majority only identified three district court cases and one Ninth Circuit case
supporting its conclusion."l 5 Conversely, Judge Newman presented nearly
twenty cases showing that "jury trials of issues of patent validity appear
from the early days of the nation's jurisprudence," and that, contrary to the
majority's conclusion, "the reported cases rais[ed] no issue of entitlement
to a jury depending on the remedy for infringement.""116 Although Judge
Newman conceded that "most but not all cases mention[ed] damages as a
remedy,"'' 17 the majority noted that all of the cases she actually did cite
involved infringement actions seeking damages." 18
IV. APPLYING THE MARKMAN ANALYSIS TO TECHNOLOGY LICENSING
Although the Federal Circuit majority properly began its analysis by
employing the two-pronged historical-analog test of Tull and looking at
precedent, it arrived at the wrong conclusion. The historical record strongly
suggests that a proper application of the historical-analog test would guar-
antee the right to jury trial in invalidity suits. At a minimum, the historical-
analog test fails to show with sufficient clarity that invalidity suits do not
support the right to jury trial, as was the case when the Supreme Court
applied the test to claim construction in Markman II. Moreover, precedent
11. See Technology Licensing, 423 F.3d at 1292 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Jury trial of Gen-
num's claim of invalidity is available as of right, whatever the requested remedy for infringement.").
112. Judge Newman also seems to support the view that a counterclaim of invalidity would support
the right to trial by jury. See id. at 1296 (distinguishing Tegal by noting that "invalidity was raised as a
defense, not as a claim or counterclaim" (emphasis added)).
113. Id. at 1292. The Supreme Court established that the "adjudication of legal rights" gives rise to
the right to jury trial in Parsons v. Bedford. See 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (explaining that for
purposes of the Seventh Amendment, "suits at common law" refers to "suits in which legal rights were
to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recog-
nized, and equitable remedies were administered"). The legal rights to be adjudicated in a patent inva-
lidity suit include, of course, the patentee's property rights in the patent.
114. See Technology Licensing, 423 F.3d at 1291; id. at 1293-94 (Newman, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 1291 (majority opinion) (citing Shubin v. U.S. Dist. Court, 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir.
1963); Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., No. 01-680-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6677 (D. Del. Apr.
17, 2003); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00 C 5791, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16873 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 12, 2001); Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 00 C 1475, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7171 (N.D. Ill.
May 2,2001)).
116. Id. at 1293-94 (Newman, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1294.
118. Id. at 1290 n.2 (majority opinion).
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provides even less guidance on the right to jury trial for invalidity claims
than it did on the right to jury trial in the context of claim construction.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit should have either (a) held that, based on the
historical-analog test, the right to jury trial attaches to declaratory judgment
actions for patent invalidity; or (b) declared the historical-analog test and
precedent inconclusive, and followed the lead of the Supreme Court in
Markman II by analyzing functional considerations and policy concerns.
Whereas functional considerations may indicate that claim construction is
better left to the judge, the determination of patent invalidity is almost in-
variably highly fact-intensive and should be the province of the jury.
Moreover, the policy concerns of uniformity and certainty invoked in
Markman II do not control where patent validity is at stake. Rather, effi-
ciency and fairness concerns suggest that the right to jury trial should be
maintained in all declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity, regard-
less of the type of remedy sought by the patentee.
A. Historical-Analog Test and Precedent
The historical record strongly suggests that, under the Tull test, the
most appropriate historical analog of a declaratory judgment action for
patent invalidity is the writ of scirefacias, rather than the inverted form of
the declaratory judgment action endorsed by most members of the Federal
Circuit. Moreover, case law fails to provide significant support for the ma-
jority's conclusion in Technology Licensing.
1. Writ of Scire Facias
To determine the outcome of the historical-analog test as it relates to
the writ of scirefacias, two issues must be resolved. First, one must deter-
mine whether the writ was broadly used to invalidate patents in 1791 or
was instead only used more narrowly to invalidate patents for fraud. If the
writ was used more broadly to invalidate patents, then it clearly provides a
close historical analog to declaratory judgment actions for patent invalid-
ity;119 conversely, if the writ was only used to invalidate patents for fraud,
then it is perhaps more analogous to a declaratory judgment for unenforce-
ability due to inequitable conduct.120 Second, if the writ of scirefacias is
119. Note that, if the writ of scirefacias was used more broadly to invalidate patents, it would
satisfy both prongs of the historical-analog test because it would (1) closely resemble the form of the
invalidity declaratory judgment action, and (2) provide the same remedy as the invalidity declaratory
judgment action (i.e., invalidate the patent).
120. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that the writ of scire
facias "was used to attack fraudulently obtained patents," and that "[tihe contemporary analog of the
writ is thus an action for a declaration of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct, not due to invalid-
947
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indeed the closest historical analog, one must also determine whether the
scirefacias action was a suit at common law, or was tried in courts of eq-
uity, in 1791. If one concludes that it was a suit at common law, then the
first prong of the historical-analog test dictates that the right to jury trial
should attach to declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity.
121
The majority in Lockwood, in an analysis endorsed by the majority in
Technology Licensing, found dispositive case law suggesting that the writ
of scire facias had been used only to invalidate patents obtained by
fraud. 122 The Lockwood majority had largely relied on Ex parte Wood &
Brundage, where the Supreme Court had stated that the writ of scirefacias
was issued at common law in order "to repeal patents which have been
obtained surreptitiously, or upon false suggestion."' 123 But although the
Lockwood majority concluded that scire facias was not the appropriate
historical analog, it also concluded that the writ "was, with respect to the
factual issues raised therein, a legal, rather than an equitable, affair, thereby
entitling the parties to a jury as of right."
124
In her dissent from an order in Lockwood denying rehearing en banc,
Judge Nies (joined by Judges Archer and Plager) drew the exact opposite
conclusion. 125 Judge Nies noted that "fraud" was "only one of the three
situations in which a writ of scirefacias was grantable," with the other two
situations being where "[a] previous patent had issued on the invention,"
and where there was an "[u]nlawful grant" of the patent. 126 Therefore,
unlike the majority, Judge Nies determined that the writ of scirefacias was
indeed the closest historical analog to a declaratory judgment action for
patent invalidity. But Judge Nies also disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that the writ of scirefacias was tried in courts of law, stating that the
ity"), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). More recently, however, a Federal Circuit panel (with Judges
Rader and Lourie in the majority and Judge Newman dissenting) declined to hold that the writ was the
appropriate historical analog even where a party seeks a declaration of unenforceability due to inequita-
ble conduct. See Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods., Inc., 451 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Agfa, Judge Rader
rather strangely concluded that while Lockwood "is easy to misread for the proposition that a writ of
scirefacias is the historic analog of inequitable conduct," the Lockwood court had merely been observ-
ing that inequitable conduct might provide an example of a modem action that is similar to the writ. Id.
at 1373-74.
121. Arguably, this reasoning could also support the right to jury trial in cases with counterclaims,
or possibly even defenses, of patent invalidity, rather than just declaratory judgment actions.
122. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974 n.9.
123. Id. (quoting Exparte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 609 (1824)).
124. Id. at 975 n.9. The court noted that the writ was tried in the court of chancery, which "exer-
cised both legal and equitable powers," and that "in a scire facias raising genuine issues of material
fact, the proceeding in chancery was suspended pending a determination by a jury summoned in the
Court of King's Bench, the main law court." Id. at 974-75 n.9.
125. Id. at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
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action was instead tried in courts of equity which "[flrequently... decided
the facts respecting validity themselves or treated juries as advisory, merely
to inform the conscience of the court." 127 Accordingly, Judge Nies con-
cluded that the historical-analog test did not support the right to trial by
jury. 128
In her dissent in Technology Licensing, Judge Newman arrived at yet
a different conclusion. Like Judges Nies, Archer, and Plager, Judge New-
man determined that the writ of scirefacias was the closest historical ana-
log to patent invalidity claims. 129 But unlike Judges Nies, Archer, and
Plager-and in agreement with the Lockwood majority-Judge Newman
determined that the scire facias action was legal rather than equitable in
nature. 130 Having found that the writ of scire facias applied to invalidity
suits beyond mere fraud and that the action was legal in nature, Judge
Newman concluded that the historical-analog test supported the right to
jury trial in patent invalidity suits.
131
The historical record largely supports Judge Newman's analysis. In
her lengthy dissent in Markman I, Judge Newman identified early English
case law indicating that the writ of scirefacias was used to invalidate pat-
ents on grounds beyond mere fraud. 132 For example, writs of scirefacias
were filed to revoke patents based on lack of novelty in both Rex v. Ark-
wright133 and Rex v. Else. 134 Moreover, numerous early- to mid-nineteenth-
century English treatises cite other examples of seventeenth- and eight-




129. In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting).
130. Id. ("Patent validity was a common law action tried to a jury in Eighteenth Century Eng-
land.").
131. See id. at 1296 ("The panel majority's conclusion-that a suit to revoke or invalidate a patent
on grounds other than fraud could not be brought in England and was not triable to a jury-is directly
contrary to English and succeeding American precedent applying Seventh Amendment principles.").
The Technology Licensing majority argues that Judge Newman's dissent ignores "Lockwood's clear
ruling that the writ of scirefacias ... is not analogous to the modern-day action to invalidate a patent."
Id. at 1290 n.2 (majority opinion). But given that Lockwood was vacated by the Supreme Court in
American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995), its "ruling" can hardly be treated as bind-
ing precedent.
132. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 1013-15 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
133. 1 Carp. P.C. 53, 101 (K.B. 1785) ("[hlf... you are satisfied none of [the machine's compo-
nents] were inventions unknown at the time this patent was granted, or that they were not invented by
the defendant; upon either of these points the prosecutor is entitled to your verdict.").
134. I Carp. P.C. 103 (K.B. 1785) (involving a writ of scirefacias filed to repeal patent where
there was no new invention).
135. See, e.g., JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN;
AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 331 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son
1820) ("[I]n such case the party prejudiced may ... have a scirefacias to repeal [the patent], as well as
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Why then, one might ask, do many sources-such as those identified
by the majority in Lockwood1 36-state that the writ of scirefacias was only
used to invalidate patents based on fraud? The likely answer to this ques-
tion becomes apparent when considering the process by which inventors
had obtained their patents in England:
The Attorney-general, or officer who advises the Crown, must in
every case in which the grant of a patent is not opposed, rely solely on
the statements of the person petitioning for the patent, and no one can be
present on behalf of the public to controvert any of the statements he
may make in support of his claim for a patent. Even in opposed cases the
party opposing can obtain no information respecting the nature of the in-
vention for which a patent is sought, except what he may acquire from
the title of the invention inserted in the petition ....
... The law, therefore, takes especial care to protect the Crown
against false petitions and representations. It is accordingly laid down
that it is the duty of every one obtaining a grant from the Queen, to see
that she is correctly informed respecting the grant.... And when facts
are recited in a patent respecting the subject-matter of the grant, it will
be presumed that the statements contained in the recital were repre-
sented or suggested to the Queen by the patentee.
The material particulars respecting an alleged invention for which a
party seeks to obtain a patent, must... be stated in the petition for the
patent. The petition must therefore state, that the petitioner is the inven-
the King; as in the instance of an unfounded patent for an invention, or where the specification is incor-
rect." (footnotes omitted)); FOSTER, supra note 108, at 242, 245-46 ("Every such grant by letters patent
of the sole right to make, use, exercise, and vend any invention, is void, if the invention was 'not in-
vented or found out' by the grantee, or first introduced into the kingdom by him; and also if the inven-
tion is not new, and useful to the public. It is also void for uncertainty, or for being too general; for
misrecitals; for false suggestions, by which the Queen has been deceived or misinformed in her grant,
or where she has granted more than she lawfully may, or what may be to the prejudice of the common-
wealth, or to the general injury of the people; or where she has granted the same thing to two per-
sons .... If a patent be void for any of the reasons which have been briefly assigned, as sufficient to
invalidate the grant, the Queen ... may have a scirefacias to repeal her own grant. A scirefacias is the
only means which the law provides for the repealing of letters patent .... The subject also who is
prejudiced by a grant may of right petition the Queen for leave to use her name in a writ of scirefacias
for its repeal." (footnotes omitted)); RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT; WITH AN INTRODUCTORY BOOK ON MONOPOLIES;
ILLUSTRATED WITH NOTES OF THE PRINCIPAL CASES 195-96 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son
1823) ("[Tlhe grant is invalid when the patentee is not the inventor, when its object is not a manufac-
ture, and when the specification is not sufficiently correct .... Upon these grounds letters patent are
voidable in themselves, but cannot be treated as of no effect in law until they are cancelled by the legal
process of a writ of scirefacias ..." (footnotes omitted)); W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW RELATING TO PATENT PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS; AND THE PRACTICE OF
OBTAINING LETTERS PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS; WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES, RULES, FORMS 378
(London, V. & R. Stevens & G. S. Norton & W. Benning & Co. 1846) ("[T]he law provides a remedy
for the public by action of scirefacias .... and if any valid objection is sustained, the result is, that the
patent is repealed or annulled, and ordered to be cancelled." (emphasis added)).
136. See, e.g., Exparte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 609 (1824) (stating scirefacias
is used "to repeal patents which have been obtained surreptitiously, or upon false suggestions").
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tor or importer of the invention, and that the invention possesses the
qualities of novelty, utility, & c., so as to be the proper subject of a grant
by patent. The substance of the petition for a patent is always recited in
the patent itself, and therefore the patent itself shows upon what repre-
sentations of the patentee it has been granted; and if the patentee has rep-
resented any thing which was untrue in any material particular, or has
induced the Crown to make an illegal grant, the patent is entirely
void.137
Clearly, then, the concept of "fraud" could have an extremely broad
meaning with respect to patent validity. Because patentability requirements
such as novelty and utility were satisfied solely by the patentee's represen-
tations to the Queen or King, any later finding of a lack of novelty or utility
would have to be construed as a misrepresentation--or fraud-perpetrated
by the patentee on the Crown. "Fraud," therefore, could refer to invalidity
based on virtually any grounds. As a result, the writ of scirefacias provides
a close historical analog to all modem invalidity actions, rather than just
actions for unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.
The historical record also supports Judge Newman's conclusion
(shared by the Lockwood majority) that the writ of scire facias was legal
rather than equitable in nature. The writ of scire facias issued out of the
Petty Bag Office of Chancery, where "all the common-law proceedings of
the Court are carried on." 138 Moreover, while legal issues arising from
demurrer may have been tried in Chancery in the late eighteenth century,
remaining issues of fact were sent to the Court of King's Bench to be tried
by a jury. 139 Therefore, the writ of scire facias was at least partly legal
rather than equitable in nature, with the factual issues of invalidity tried by
137. HINDMARCH, supra note 135, at 377-78 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
138. FOSTER, supra note 108, at 248. "In the chancery are two courts, one ordinary,... [a]nother
extraordinary according to the rule of equity .. " EDWARDO COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS 79 (London, W.
Clark & Sons 1817). "The process[] in [the ordinary] court is under the great seal according to the
court[] of the common law." Id. at 82.
139. See COKE, supra note 138, at 79 (stating that if, in a scirefacias action, "the parties descend to
issue, [Chancery] cannot try it by jury, but the lord chancelour or lord keeper delivereth the record by
his proper hands into the kings bench to be tried there .... ); FOSTER, supra note 108, at 262 ("[I]f
there were a demurrer to part, and issue on facts as to the residue, the demurrer might be determined in
Chancery, a transcript of the record containing the issue in fact, being sent into the Court of Queen's
Bench to be tried .... Formerly, the practice was, if there were a demurrer to part and an issue on the
residue, for the Chancellor to deliver... a transcript of the whole record to the Court of Queen's Bench,
and judgment was given there, upon the demurrer as well as upon the issue .... (footnotes omitted));
HINDMARCH, supra note 135, at 401-03 ("When there are any issues to be tried, except those which
must be tried by a jury, the trial may take place in the Court of Chancery. Thus, an issue in law raised
by a demurrer may be decided by the Lord Chancellor .... An issue cannot be tried by a jury in Chan-
cery, for that Court has no authority to call a jury to its bar. But when there is any issue joined in an
action in that Court, which must be tried by a jury, the Court awards a venirefacias to the sheriff re-
turnable in the Queen's Bench .... The record is then to be taken into the Queen's Bench in order that
the issues may be there tried." (footnotes omitted)).
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a jury. Accordingly, the historical-analog test dictates that the right to jury
trial should attach to declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity.
2. Inverted Form of Declaratory Judgment Action
Even if one were to conclude that, despite the weight of historical evi-
dence, the writ of scirefacias does not provide a sufficiently close histori-
cal analog to a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity, the
"inverted form" of the declaratory judgment action would hardly provide a
satisfying candidate either. By viewing the inverted form as the appropriate
analog, the court considers only the remedy sought by the patentee while
completely ignoring the remedy sought by the claimant, and therefore dis-
regards the nature of the action as a whole.
The Federal Circuit first held that the inverted form of the declaratory
judgment action for invalidity constitutes the appropriate historical analog
in Lockwood.140 The Lockwood majority cited a host of law review articles
advocating the "inverted lawsuit" approach when applying the historical-
analog test to declaratory judgment actions in general, 14 1 and also cited two
treatises meant to support the more specific proposition that the inverted
lawsuit approach should be used for declaratory judgment actions for pat-
ent invalidity. 142 The law review articles, however, lack any strong persua-
sive value because they do not specifically address patent invalidity
actions. Moreover, neither of the cited treatises expressly advocates the
inverted lawsuit analysis for patent invalidity suits; instead, they primarily
point out only that the issues to be tried in a patent invalidity declaratory
judgment action are the same as the issues that would arise when an in-
fringement suit is brought and the defendant raises a defense or counter-
claim of invalidity. 143
The Lockwood majority also attempted to support its conclusion by
citing several cases in which the court used the inverted lawsuit approach
140. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("In other words, 'our
search.., for a single historical analog, taking into consideration the nature of the cause and the rem-
edy as two important factors,' has produced one satisfactory analog-namely, a suit for patent in-
fringement in which the affirmative defense of invalidity has been pled." (quoting Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412,422 n.6 (1987))), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
141. Id.at975n.11.
142. Id. at 975 n.10.
143. See id. (quoting Donald S. Chisum's Patents treatise for the proposition that a "suit for de-
claratory judgment of invalidity 'is in substance an infringement suit with the parties initially re-
versed,"' and Moore's Federal Practice treatise for the proposition that "[a] declaratory action brought
by the accused infringer is for the purpose of securing a judicial determination of plaintiff's immunity
from the operation of the patent laws-not to assert rights provided by those laws," and that "[t]he
issues sought to be adjudicated are precisely the same as in an infringement suit[.]" (alteration in origi-
nal)).
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to determine whether the right to jury trial attached to declaratory judgment
actions. 144 None of the cited cases, however, dealt specifically with actions
seeking declarations of patent invalidity, and they did not broadly hold that
the inverted form of the action should always dictate the availability of the
right to jury trial. Rather, the cases support the narrower proposition that
the inverted form is the appropriate analog if the declaratory judgment ac-
tion is "merely an inverted lawsuit."'145
The Supreme Court, however, clearly established that a declaratory
judgment action for patent invalidity is not merely an inverted lawsuit. In
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., the Court reviewed
and rejected the Federal Circuit's "practice of routinely vacating declara-
tory judgments regarding patent validity following a determination of non-
infringement."' 146 The Federal Circuit had justified this practice under the
constitutional justiciability doctrine of mootness: if the party seeking a
declaratory judgment of invalidity could not "illustrate ... the continued
existence of a case or controversy should a decision of noninfringement be
made," then the declaratory judgment action must be vacated. 147 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that it is instead the burden of the party sug-
gesting mootness to "com[e] forward with the subsequent events" that
suggest there is no longer a case or controversy. 148 If no party comes for-
ward to advise the appellate court "of a material change in circumstances
that entirely terminate[s] the party's controversy," then the court retains
jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action.
149
In addition to concluding that the Federal Circuit was not constitution-
ally required to vacate judgments of validity or invalidity in all cases where
judgments of noninfringement were affirmed, the Supreme Court in Cardi-
nal identified policy concerns suggesting that the Federal Circuit should
not continue its practice even as a prudential matter. 150 Those policy con-
cerns included "the importance to the public at large of resolving questions
of patent validity[,] ... the wasteful consequences of relitigating the valid-
144. See id. at 975 (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979); James v. Pennsylvania Gen.
Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 238 F.2d 322, 324-25 (8th
Cir. 1956); Hargrove v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942); Pacific Indem. Co. v.
McDonald, 107 F.2d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1939)).
145. James, 349 F.2d at 230.
146. 508 U.S. 83, 89 (1993). According to the Court in Cardinal, this practice began in 1987 when
the Federal Circuit decided Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Cardinal, 508 U.S. at
89.
147. Vieau, 823 F.2d at 1520.
148. Cardinal, 508 U.S. at 98.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 99-102.
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ity of a patent after it has once been held invalid in a fair trial,. . . the dan-
ger that the opportunity to relitigate might, as a practical matter, grant mo-
nopoly privileges to the holders of invalid patents," and the unfairness of
"depriv[ing] the patentee.., of the appellate review that is a component of
the one full and fair opportunity to have the validity issue adjudicated cor-
rectly." 151
In terms of its relevance to the historical-analog test, the crux of the
Supreme Court's holding in Cardinal is that "[a] party seeking a declara-
tory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee's
charge of infringement."' 52 This directly refutes the notion that a declara-
tory judgment action seeking invalidity is nothing more than an inverted
form of an infringement lawsuit. Judge Nies recognized this as well in her
Lockwood dissent, where she noted that the inverse of an infringement suit
would not be a declaratory judgment action for invalidity, but rather for
noninfringement. 1
53
By merely looking at the inverted form of the action, the Federal Cir-
cuit in Technology Licensing disregarded the much broader scope of the
invalidity claim.' 54 The inverted form of the action reduces the analog to a
simple infringement action, where the only remedy considered is that
sought by the patentee: a judgment for damages or injunction. Completely
lost in such an analysis is the remedy sought by the party bringing the de-
claratory judgment action: a judgment of patent invalidity. As noted by
Judge Newman, this latter remedy clearly requires an "adjudication of legal
rights,"' 155 which the Supreme Court has long held to be grounds for the
right to trial by jury. 156
151. Id. at 100-02.
152. Id. at 96.
153. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 986 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), vacated, 515
U.S. 1182 (1995). Conversely, the inverse of a declaratory judgment action for invalidity would be a
patentee's suit for a declaration of patent validity-a type of action which does not exist.
154. The court in Lockwood did, however, address the Supreme Court's Cardinal decision. See id.
at 975 n.10 (majority opinion). The court attempted to defend its conclusion that an invalidity declara-
tory judgment action is merely the inverted form of an infringement action by quoting language in
Cardinal that acknowledged the relationship between the two: "If... a party has actually been charged
with infringement of the patent, there is, necessarily, a case or controversy adequate to support jurisdic-
tion of a complaint, or a counterclaim, under the [Declaratory Judgments] Act." Id. (quoting Cardinal,
508 U.S. at 96) (alteration in original). That relationship, however, hardly establishes that the invalidity
declaratory judgment action is nothing more than an inversion of an infringement suit.
155. In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting).
156. See supra note 113.
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3. Precedent
Even if one disputes the notion that the historical-analog test conclu-
sively supports the right to jury trial in declaratory judgment actions for
patent invalidity, the results should, at a minimum, be declared uncertain-
less certain, surely, than the results of the same test as applied in Markman
II. In Markman II, after all, the Supreme Court did not seem to doubt that
the construction of specifications was the closest historical analog; none-
theless, the Court declared the test inconclusive and proceeded to look at
precedent. 157 But as in Markman II, precedent also fails to provide suffi-
cient guidance. The case law set forth by the Technology Licensing major-
ity is far less authoritative than the precedent considered by the Court in
Markman II. As noted earlier, the majority in Technology Licensing only
offers three district court cases and one Ninth Circuit case supporting its
application of the historical-analog test. 158 Conversely, in Markman II,
earlier Supreme Court case law was identified supporting the view that
specification construction was the province of the judge and not the jury.1
59
Despite having built a relatively strong case for holding that the his-
torical-analog test and precedent were dispositive, however, the Court in
Markman II merely concluded that they "provide[d] no clear answers" as to
whether the right to jury trial should attach to claim construction. 160 In
refusing to deny the right to trial by jury based solely on its application of
the historical-analog test and precedent, the Supreme Court seems to have
recognized that the presumption should not be against trial by jury where
the answer is not exceptionally clear. Instead, the Court held true to the
principle that the right to jury trial in civil cases should be "jealously
guarded."'161 The Federal Circuit in Technology Licensing-given its
highly questionable conclusion that the writ of scire facias is not the ap-
propriate historical analog to the declaratory judgment action for patent
invalidity-should have at least followed the Supreme Court's example by
proceeding to look at functional considerations and policy concerns.
157. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 11), 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).
158. See supra note 115.
159. See supra note 40. Admittedly, the case law cited by Judge Newman in Technology Licensing
also fails to provide any clear answers, because, as the majority noted, none of the cited cases involved
invalidity claims where the patentee sought only equitable relief. Technology Licensing, 423 F.3d at
1290 n.2. Unlike the historical-analog test, then, precedent provides no strong support for either posi-
tion.
160. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 388.
161. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942).
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B. Functional Considerations
Patent claims can be found invalid for a variety of reasons, including
lack of novelty (anticipation), obviousness, inadequate disclosure (i.e.,
failure to meet the written description, enablement, best mode, or definite-
ness requirements), ineligible subject matter, or lack of utility. 162 Most of
these grounds for invalidity are very likely to involve issues that are highly
fact-intensive, and many are likely to require credibility assessments-
judgments of the sort traditionally considered to be squarely within the
jury's forte. 163
Anticipation, for example, requires the fact-finder to identify the rele-
vant prior art as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102.164 Identifying the prior art
requires geographical determinations, such as whether an activity took
place in the United States, 165 and temporal determinations, such as which
person was the first to invent 166 or what date an invention first became
publicly accessible. 167 Some examples of the many other potential fact
questions involved in identifying the prior art can include whether the use
of an invention was secret or public; 168 whether an invention was aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed; 169 and whether a commercial offer for
sale was made. 170 Credibility judgments can be very important for each of
these issues, and, unlike the construction of legal documents, the issues
require no special legal expertise on the part of jurors.
162. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 297-98.
163. See Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 389-90 (recognizing the "jury's capabilities to evaluate de-
meanor, to sense the 'mainsprings of human conduct,' or to reflect community standards" (citations
omitted)). Even some who are rather cynical of jurors' competence in patent cases recognize that the
jury does have strengths that may be utilized. For example, although Judge Michel of the Federal
Circuit remarked that jurors have "too hard a job, one which they cannot do very well," he also advo-
cated defining a role for juries in areas where they "can do ... things best-things like assessing credi-
bility." Michel, supra note 13.
164. See MUELLER, supra note 5, at 94 ("If a patent, journal article, or other document [does not]
qualify under some subsection of 35 U.S.C. § 102.... then [it] is not legally available for use as prior
art to negate the presumed novelty of the applicant's claimed invention.").
165. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2000) (invalidating a patent claim if invalidating knowledge or
use occurred "in this country").
166. See, e.g., id. § 102(g)(2) (invalidating a patent claim if "before [the patentee's] inven-
tion.., the invention was made in this country by another inventor").
167. See, e.g., id. § 102(a) (invalidating a patent claim if the "invention was known or used by
others ... before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent").
168. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that a secret, non-informing use by a third party cannot invalidate a patent claim under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)).
169. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (preventing the invalidation of a patent claim if another's otherwise
invalidating invention was "abandoned, suppressed, or concealed").
170. See id. § 102(b) (invalidating a patent claim if "invention was ... on sale in this country, more
than one year prior" to the U.S. application date).
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Moreover, after ascertaining the prior art's content and scope, the fact-
finder must decide whether there is identity between any single piece of
prior art and the claimed invention. 171 Identity is-and has long been-a
question of fact for the jury. In Bischoff v. Wethered, for example, "the
[Supreme] Court drew a line between issues of document interpretation and
product identification, and held that expert testimony was properly pre-
sented to the jury on the latter, ultimate issue .... -172 Similarly, in Keyes v.
Grant, the Court stated that identity between an asserted patent and a prior-
art publication "was a question of fact properly to be left for determination
to the jury."'17
3
Nonobviousness raises many of the same factual issues as anticipation
when determining the scope and content of the prior art. 174 Other factual
issues inherent in the ultimate question of obviousness include whether
prior art qualifies as "analogous art,"'175 determining the differences be-
tween the prior art and the invention (similar to the task of determining
identity), 176 and determining whether "secondary indicia" indicate that the
changes made by the patentee over the prior art were obvious.177 The sec-
ondary indicia alone involve a large number of factual considerations.1
78
Some of the disclosure requirements can also be very fact-intensive.
For example, a patent specification must "enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains... to make and use" the invention. 179 Although
171. See MUELLER, supra note 5, at 97 ("[l]n order to evidence anticipation of a claimed invention
under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a single prior art reference must disclose every element of that invention, ar-
ranged as in the claim.").
172. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 11), 517 U.S. 370, 386 (1996) (discussing
Bischoffv. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1870)).
173. 118 U.S. 25, 37 (1886).
174. See MUELLER, supra note 5, at 140 ("[Case law and legislative history] sources make clear
that 35 U.S.C. § 102, the statutory provision that governs novelty and loss of right, is key to determin-
ing the scope of the prior art available in [an obviousness] analysis under § 103." (footnote omitted)).
175. In an obviousness analysis, a court cannot consider references in fields of art that are "too
remote to be treated as prior art." In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Sovish,
769 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). An art is "too remote" (i.e., non-analogous) if it is neither (1)
"within the field of the inventor's endeavor"; nor (2) "reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
with which the inventor was involved." In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting In
re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
176. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 146-47.
177. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("[S]econdary considera-
tions.., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have rele-
vancy.").
178. Some secondary indicia of nonobviousness include considerations such as commercial suc-
cess, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected results. Id. at 17; Hybritech Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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enablement is ultimately a question of law, 180 it can depend on many un-
derlying facts, such as the factual issues raised by the requirement that a
person skilled in the art be able to make and use the described invention
without "undue experimentation":
Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would
require undue experimentation .... include (1) the quantity of experi-
mentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented,
(3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the
art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.
18 1
Moreover, a patent specification must "set forth the best mode con-
templated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 182 As with en-
ablement, the "best mode" requirement is fact-intensive:
Determining whether a patent complies with the best mode re-
quirement involves two underlying factual inquiries. First, it must be de-
termined whether, at the time the patent application was filed, the
inventor had a best mode of practicing the claimed invention. This in-
quiry is wholly subjective and addresses whether the inventor must dis-
close any facts in addition to those sufficient for enablement. Second, if
the inventor had a best mode of practicing the claimed invention, it must
be determined whether the specification adequately disclosed what the
inventor contemplated as the best mode so that those having ordinary
skill in the art could practice it.
183
For the first part of that analysis, a fact-finder would need to deter-
mine the inventor's subjective knowledge. Because "[t]he state of a per-
son's mind is rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence, and usually
must be inferred from evidence of his or her acts," the inquiry is "one espe-
cially suited for resolution by a trial jury."
184
Unlike the issue of claim construction that the Supreme Court consid-
ered in Markman II, then, many of the issues inherent in determinations of
patent validity are entirely factual. Whereas claim construction requires the
interpretation of a legal document, common validity issues such as novelty
and nonobviousness require an assessment of whether a patented invention
already existed historically. While the former has traditionally been consid-
ered to be, for the most part, a matter of law, 18 5 the latter constitutes a quin-
180. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
181. Id. at 737.
182. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
183. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omit-
ted).
184. United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 2003).
185. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Traditionally courts have treated the construction of [documents such as contracts, deeds, and wills]
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tessential fact question. Therefore, unlike in Markman II, functional con-




The Supreme Court in Markman H saw "the importance in uniform-
ity" as an additional, independent reason to assign the issue of claim con-
struction to the judge rather than the jury. 187 The Court's emphasis on
uniformity reflected its broader concern with certainty: "[T]he limits of a
patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement
of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the
patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public."' 188 The Court's logic,
however, does not extend to the issue of patent validity.
The public's certainty regarding the validity of a patent claim is, of
course, at least as important as the precise meaning of the claim's language.
Patent law, however, already provides a great deal of certainty in this area:
once a patent claim has been adjudicated and held invalid, collateral estop-
pel bars the patentee from asserting that patent claim against anyone in the
future. 189 Thus, the public can rest assured that, with rare exceptions, 190 an
invalidated patent claim will remain invalid. The policy concerns support-
ing the Court's decision in Markman I therefore play no significant role
with regard to the right to jury trial in invalidity claims.
Other concerns, implicating fairness to the patentee and judicial effi-
ciency, weigh in favor of preserving the patentee's right to jury trial in
as being a legal question for the court, but have stated that under certain circumstances the interpreta-
tion of an agreement may raise jury triable questions.").
186. Of course, some argue that, due to the complexity of the subject matter in many patent dis-
putes, the role of the jury should be minimized or eliminated in all patent cases. See supra note 2. That
much broader argument is not addressed here, however, other than to repeat the Federal Circuit's
statement that, "[s]o long as the Seventh Amendment stands, the right to a jury trial should not be
rationed, nor should particular issues in particular types of cases be treated differently from similar
issues in other types of cases." Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The court in Connell also noted that any complications arising from the requirement that jurors put
themselves "in the shoes of one 'skilled in the art' at the time the invention was made" are little differ-
ent than the complications arising in a negligence suit, where jurors are required to put themselves "in
the shoes of a 'reasonable person' at the time of the events giving rise to the suit." Id.
187. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 11), 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
188. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)).
189. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (overruling
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), "to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a
charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid").
190. For collateral estoppel to apply, the patentee must have had a "full and fair opportunity" to
litigate the patent claim's validity. See id. at 329 ("Although neither judges, the parties, nor the adver-
sary system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of determining whether the party against
whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.").
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declaratory judgment actions for invalidity. In Technology Licensing, for
example, the patentee TLC could have retained the right to jury trial, but
only by holding on to its damages claim. 191 Gennum, the alleged infringer,
had initially sought a jury trial itself.192 After learning that only a small
amount of monetary damages would be recoverable, therefore, TLC per-
haps thought it was "safe" to drop the request for damages without losing
the right to jury trial. Once TLC dropped its damages claim, however, the
decision whether validity would be tried before a jury was left solely to
Gennum. By the time Gennum decided not to try its case to a jury, TLC
could not reinstate its damages claim and therefore had no control over the
matter.
While this course of events may appear to be little more than poor
maneuvering on the part of TLC, it does raise concerns of fairness and
judicial efficiency. Under the holding of Technology Licensing, any pat-
entee wanting to guarantee its right to jury trial in all procedural settings
must always seek monetary damages, even if those damages would be triv-
ial. The value in requiring a patentee to seek damages, with the additional
time and cost that a claim for damages would entail, is at best question-
able-particularly when the validity issue may greatly outweigh the issue
of damages.
The efficiency and fairness concerns addressed here may not be espe-
cially compelling given the rarity with which situations similar to those in
Technology Licensing may arise. 193 Nonetheless, no policy concerns weigh
against the right to jury trial in invalidity actions. Therefore, the conclusion
dictated by functional considerations should prevail, and the right to jury
trial should attach to all declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit wrongly decided In re Technology Licensing. If
the issue presents itself in the future, the Federal Circuit should reconsider
it en banc and overrule the holding of the Technology Licensing majority.
Application of the historical-analog test should have led to the conclusion
that the writ of scire facias provides the appropriate historical analog to a
191. A patentee whose patent claims were infringed is always entitled to damages that are "in no
event less than a reasonable royalty." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
192. In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
193. The sequence of events in Technology Licensing that resulted in TLC losing its right to jury
trial (described in Part II, supra) was rather unusual. As noted by the court, "the problem faced by TLC
is not likely to recur with frequency in conventional infringement actions." Id. at 1291.
[Vol 82:2
2007] RECONSIDERING IN RE TECHNOLOGY LICENSING CORPORATION 961
declaratory judgment action 194 for patent invalidity, and that the right to
jury trial therefore attaches. Moreover, the court should have focused on
the nature of the action as a whole, including the remedy sought by the
party seeking invalidity, rather than just the remedy sought by the patentee.
At the very least, given the judiciary's traditional concern with preserving
the right to jury trial even in civil actions, the Federal Circuit should have
followed the lead of the Supreme Court in Markman I and looked at func-
tional considerations and policy concerns. Under that analysis, the highly
fact-intensive nature of invalidity issues would have dictated that the right
to jury trial be preserved.
194. In addition to declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity, the conclusions suggested
here would likely also be appropriate for counterclaims of patent invalidity, because they likewise
constitute claims independent of the infringement claim. Such a holding, however, may be broader than
the facts of Technology Licensing would require.

